Abstract
Introduction
Routing protocols are a critical component of the Internet. Their goal is to ensure that normal traffic is able to efficiently make it from source to destination. While routing protocols are based on simple theories, designing a protocol that functions correctly and efficiently under real loads is difficult. In addition, testing the protocols under realistic scenarios is often impossible. Simulations of large scale routing are either too complex to perform or too simplistic to accurately predict the challenges encountered on real networks. Large scale testbeds don't exist, and monitoring the protocol on production systems is also difficult. This paper presents the results of a detailed study into just this kind of real-world system. This study collected routing protocol data from MichNet, a mid-sized regional Internet service provider covering the state of Michigan. Data was collected from four geographically distributed probe machines running custom monitoring software. This year-long effort collected information continuously from MichNet's intra-domain routing protocol, OSPF. We used this data to analyze the performance of OSPF on a production network and discovered surprising anomalies. There is a long history of studies looking for these kinds of problems in routing protocols. Detailed studies of routing on the Internet have uncovered significant problems with the performance of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [4; 7; 8; 9; 10] . BGP, an interdomain routing protocol, interconnects the autonomous systems that comprise the Internet. As such, any significant problems with BGP can affect routing on the Internet as a whole. Unlike BGP, the work on intra-domain routing protocols such as OSPF and IS-IS has mainly focused on their behavior in controlled envoironments [2; 3; 13; 15] . Distinguished by the fact that they are run within an autonomous system, intra-domain routing protocols have a significant impact on the performance of the local network. In addition, because inter-domain and intra-domain routing protocols are often interdependent, problems with one can affect the performance of the other. While these studies based on simulations and small scale testbeds have identified important issues, they still fall short of identifying the issues that affect these protocols on production networks. Our work, however, has focused on understanding the performance of intra-domain protocols under real-world conditions. We attempt to highlight several anomalies of OSPF that are not seen under controlled conditions. Our work also complements the few existing studies that have looked at the behavior of intra-domain routing protocols on production networks. Our work extends these studies by providing year-long analysis, corroborating others' results and introducing previously unseen results. A study of Qwest's network focused on issues affecting the convergence time of IS-IS [1] . This study identified single, flapping links as the predominant source of instability. It also made the theoretical case for using an incremental short-est path algorithm. Our work corroborates this by identifying the lopsided distribution of problem links and providing practical measurements supporting the argument for an incremental shortest path algorithm. Our work also complements two studies concurrent to ours. The first paper analyzes link failures on Sprint's IS-IS backbone [5] . It examines the temporal locality and duration of link failures in addition to studying the effects of induced link failures. The second paper provides a more comprehensive study of OSPF on an enterprise network [14] . It also provides temporal and frequency views of instability in the network, and makes a distinction between internal OSPF links and external links. Finally, the paper looks at issues with redundant LSAs caused by OSPF's reliable forwarding mechanism. Our work presents several complementary results to these two papers. First, we present an analysis of the amount, duration, and frequency of updates seen on MichNet. We also analyze these updates both by source and by the type of change they represent. By collecting a year's worth of routing updates we are also able to demonstrate that these results are not singular anomalies but rather common issues across time and different networks.
In addition to providing complementary results to these existing and concurrent studies, our work introduces new issues with intra-domain routing. Our analysis found significant periods of localized instability. The predominant source of this strange routing behavior was from customer networks. These routes are injected into OSPF from other routing protocols such as RIP. Like most ISPs, MichNet is constructed from around 50 core, backbone routers connecting a much larger number of customer networks. Often overlooked in routing analysis, this additional layer of hierarchy is a significant source of instability. Unlike the simplified view that would consider MichNet an autonomous system, far more of the routers within MichNet are not actually under the operators' control. These customer networks often have less monitoring, lower levels of redundancy, and often use older routing protocols to maintain their connection to MichNet. These factors all contribute to the increased level of instability we see with these routes. Some of the anomalies we see from these injected routes appear to be caused by well known failure behavior of the originating routing protocol.
We also expand the existing body of knowledge by providing detailed analysis of the source and behavior of several specific anomalies. These anomalies exhibit very surprising behavior that produces notable effects throughout our analysis. In addition to highlighting previously unobserved behavior, these anomalies demonstrate the significant impact that information injected into OSPF from external routing protocols can have on the network. These specific anomalies account for the most prominent sources of instability. In addition, these anomalies demonstrate the need for new network management tools that understand routing protocols. All of these anomalies appear to go unnoticed by the network operators for significant periods of time. Better monitoring and management of the underlying routing protocols would improve the reliability and performance of the network.
The main contributions of this work are:
A detailed, year-long analysis of OSPF running on a production network. We examine the overall traffic levels as well as the amount, source, and duration of instability on the network. In addition, we examine the changes in routing topology over time. We also make an important distinction between the core OSPF network and the edge network comprising the customer connections, leading to new insights about the behavior of OSPF. We corroborate the results seen in previous work, and discuss previously unseen issues.
The identification of customer networks as a major source of instability injected into OSPF. While it is well known that customer networks are less stable, we show that this external instability causes increased instability in the core OSPF network.
The identification of individually flapping links as the predominant source of instability. These high frequency oscillations are confined to a single physical link and do not induce failures in other parts of the network. In addition, several routers contribute disproportionately to this instability. We also found that 80% of the individual periods of flapping last less than five minutes.
The discovery that the routing topology is constantly evolving although the individual changes are incremental. Rather than reverting back to a stable configuration, we found that no single topology of the network lasted longer than 28 days. In addition, we show that a significant majority of the changes to the topology require only slight modifications to the shortest path tree. This provides a strong argument for the use of an incremental shortest path calculation [1] .
An examination of specific anomalies that highlight the impact of external routes on OSPF and the need for advanced network management tools. These anomalies lasted for significant periods of time without being resolved. They demonstrate the significant negative impact that customer routes can have on OSPF. They also demonstrate the need for advanced network management tools that are able to collect information from routing protocols and alert operators of these problems.
Background
Since this paper discusses some of the finer points of the OSPF protocol, this section presents a short overview of its operation. Readers who are unfamiliar with the protocol and wish to fully understand the fine details are encouraged to read a more detailed source such as [12] .
The Internet is divided into a large number of different regions of administrative control commonly called autonomous systems. These autonomous systems (AS) usually have distinct routing policies and connect to one or more remote autonomous systems at private or public exchange points. Autonomous systems are traditionally composed of network service providers or large organizational units like college campuses and corporate networks. At the boundary of each autonomous system, peer border routers exchange reachability information to destination IP address blocks, or prefixes, for both transit networks and networks originating in that routing domain. Most autonomous systems exchange routing information through the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP).
OSPF is one of the more popular intra-domain routing protocols. Unlike inter-domain routing protocols such as BGP, intra-domain routing protocols are used to configure routing within an autonomous system. OSPF is a link state protocol, so the fundamental unit of information is the set of links or connections from each router. These links describe the set of connections a router has. These connections can be point-to-point links to other routers, connections to a shared network segment such as an Ethernet LAN, or more complex connections such as a virtual link over an ATM mesh. Each router constructs a Link State Advertisement (LSA) containing this set of links and broadcasts it to its immediate neighbors. These neighbors in turn distribute these LSAs to their neighbors until the information has been distributed to every router participating in the OSPF protocol. Once each LSA has made it to every router, each router has a complete map of the entire network and can then use Dijkstra's shortest path algorithm to compute an optimal routing path.
These LSAs describing the connections from each router are referred to as type 1, or router LSAs. There are four other LSA types, two of which we see on MichNet. Type 2, or network LSAs are used to describe the routers connected to a broadcast network. Rather than having each router on the network announce a connection to every other router on the network, OSPF uses a type 2 LSA to list all the routers connected to the network. Types 3 and 4 are known as summary LSAs. These LSAs are used when OSPF is divided into several areas. The OSPF topology on MichNet is small enough to require only one area, so we never see type 3 or 4 LSAs on the network. The final LSA type, labeled type 5 or external LSAs, are used to inject routes learned from other routing protocols into OSPF. This is most commonly used to announce connections to customer networks.
LSAs are announced by a single router and reliably broadcast to every OSPF router. Each router stores every LSA seen in the network in a local database. Each LSA has an age associated with it in order to detect stale information. LSAs are refreshed after 30 minutes by the originating router. If an LSA exists for 60 minutes (MAXAGE) without being refreshed, it is deleted from the database on every router. In order to ensure that the databases stay consistent, once a router times an LSA out of its database, it announces the LSA itself with an age of 60 minutes, to ensure that the LSA is deleted from every router's database.
Testing methodology
In order to understand the behavior of OSPF on a production network, we connected several probe machines to MichNet routers. MichNet is a statewide network composed of hundreds of routers covering the state of Michigan. These routers connect over 500 physical locations to the Internet through several outside connections. Fifty of these routers form the core OSPF network. The remainder are used for customer connections. In addition to external connections to Cable and Wireless and Qwest, MichNet has a high speed connection to Internet2.
To collect OSPF data from MichNet we deployed three probe machines and used data from an existing IPMA [6] probe machine. The bulk of the raw data used in our analysis comes from the IPMA machine which uses a custom OSPF implementation designed to dump the raw LSAs to disk without any analysis. Three additional machines were deployed running a customized version of Zebra [17] . These customizations allowed us to prevent Zebra from announcing LSAs, to run shortest path and forwarding table calculations from the perspective of each router in the network, and to use Zebra as a simulator based on raw OSPF packet data. Unlike previous studies that use custom packet collection tools, Zebra is a full OSPF implementation. This allows us to monitor the higher level actions of the protocol such as shortest path calculations and the resulting routing tables. In addition, by using a full OSPF implementation we are able to switch from more passive monitoring to actively injecting routes into the network. This can be used to actively introduce faults into the network without disturbing active links. The IPMA machine and one of the Zebra machines were deployed in Ann Arbor, the logical center of the network. The other two machines were deployed in Houghton and Berrien Springs, both closer to the edge of the network. High level examination shows that the data collected from all four probe machines is consistent.
Experimental Results & Analysis
With our measurement infrastructure in place, we attempted to answer several questions about the behavior of OSPF on a production network. First, we wanted to examine the overall level of OSPF traffic. This gives us two valuable insights. First is an understanding of how much OSPF traffic we can expect on a production network. Second is an idea of how much instability we see on the network. In addition to measuring the amount of instability, we also wanted to identify periods of instability that could be avoided by changing the routing protocol or the router configuration. Other periods of instability caused by external sources, such as power outages, are out of our control. On the other hand, we are interested in external causes that produce an abnormal amount of protocol traffic. For example, a misbehaving router interface that is rapidly switching between the up and down states can cause the routing protocol to constantly try to adapt to the changing state. Since this interface is not reliably routing packets, it would be better for the routing protocol to assume that the interface is down until the instability has settled. For simplicity, we will refer to these periods of instability that can be fixed through protocol or configuration changes as undesirable. Finally, we wanted to understand what impact these undesirable periods have on the network. We wanted to determine both how long these periods of instability last, and what impact they have on the functionality of the network. The main result is that the majority of the undesirable behavior of OSPF is due to the routes injected from customer networks. In addition, both the internal and external instability is localized to a single link with a significant percentage lasting under five minutes. The exceptions, however, demonstrate the extreme impact external routing protocols can have on OSPF and the need for better network monitoring tools.
Due to space constraints, this paper contains an abbreviated version of our analysis. Further analysis is available in the technical version of this paper [16] .
Overall traffic
The first thing we wanted to understand about MichNet is the amount of OSPF information produced by the network. Figure 1 shows the overall level of OSPF LSA announcements over a year. Each point on the graph measures the number of LSA updates per second averaged over the period of a day. Note that this is a measure of the number of LSAs seen, not the number of OSPF packets on the network. The most noticeable observation is that there are significantly more type 5 (external) LSA announcements than type 1 (router) or type 2 (network) LSA announcements. As with most ISPs, MichNet consists of a relatively small number of core backbone routers that connect their customers to the Internet. Since the number of customer routes is much larger than the number of backbone routers, we see many more external LSAs than router LSAs.
While understanding the overall level of traffic is important, our underlying goal is to differentiate between traffic that conforms to the design of the protocol and traffic that is caused by instability. On a typical day, we see about 1700 active external routes. Each one of these routes is represented by an LSA that is supposed to be refreshed every 30 minutes, and in stable state, these are the only updates we would expect to see. 1700 updates per 30 minutes corresponds to 56.7 announcements per minute. Most of the routers on MichNet wait 4 minutes before announcing LSA refreshes. Therefore, we really expect to see 1700 announcements per 34 minutes or 50 announcements per minute which is very close to the baseline level in figure 1 . Similarly, there are about 45 type 1 LSAs on a given day, or about 1.3 announcements per minute, which is also very close to the observed baseline level of traffic.
Another observation from figure 1 is that there are obvious periods of increased activity. The rest of the paper will discuss some of these periods; for now we will focus on the general observations. Also, we should point out that we are going to minimize our discussion of type 2 LSA announcements for two reasons. First, the number of type 2 announcements is so few that little changes produce big anomalies in the statistical analysis. Second, the results we do see in the type 2 announcements mirror the results from the other two LSA types.
While the baseline level of traffic we see matches our expectations, we want to understand what kind of announcements cause the levels to increase beyond the baseline. To better characterize the source of LSA announcements, we label each LSA with the type of update it represents.
New: An LSA that has not been seen before. These are mostly seen as our monitoring starts, but are also seen as new routers or links are added to the network. This is different from the definition used in RFC 2328 [11] where new is used to denote a new instance of an LSA. Refresh: An LSA that contains no changes. These are used by the protocol to ensure consistency across all routers. Down: An LSA that has been explicitly removed from the database. The age of the LSA is set to MAXAGE and announced to all routers, ensuring that this path is quickly removed from the database. It usually represents a failed link. Up: An LSA that was seen previously but was not currently active. This usually represents a link coming back up after a failure. Modified: An LSA that has changed a parameter not related to up or down status. This usually represents something simple like a metric change. For type 1 and 2 LSAs this often represents a change with one of the attached links. Timeout: A marker in the data representing an LSA that has timed out in our local database. This LSA is not ever sent on the network, instead it is used to recognize LSAs that timed out before ever being explicitly marked down.
These labels are also used to describe changes in individual links in type 1 LSAs and the set of attached routers in type 2 LSAs. It's important to note that there are two sources of updates that we add into the data. Since LSAs are removed from the database after 60 minutes, we add an explicit update with a timeout label into the data. Since normal routers will broadcast the fact that they've timed out an LSA, this update is usually followed by the down update produced by another router. In addition, since type 1 link deletions and type 2 router membership deletions are represented by re-announcing the LSA with the removed link or router omitted, we add an explicit entry into the LSA labeled down to keep track of these implicit announcements. Figures 2 and 3 show the year-long announcements broken down by update type. We have omitted most of the update types because they don't produce enough data to show up on the graph. In addition, the type 5 up announcements mirror the type 5 down announcements, so they have been removed for clarity. It is important to first point out that an individual link changing state results in changes for type 5 LSAs at the LSA level, while type 1 LSAs have more than one link per LSA. This is why the type 1 data is dominated by modified announcements with very few down/up announcements. The modified label in this case represents something changing in the LSA; in particular one of the links changing state. The up and down labels on the other hand represent the entire router going up or down.
As we saw before, the baseline amount of refresh traffic represents the stable operation of the network. For the most part, this is the predominant source of announcements. However, for the type 1 announcements, the level of modified events exceeds the level of refreshes on several occasions. For both LSA types however, the predominant periods of instability can be traced back to a single link. Due to the topology of the network there are far more type 5 links than type 1 links. This means that a single type 1 link flapping produces a much higher relative level of traffic. Several of these spikes represent significant periods of instability. For example, during the end of May into the beginning of June we see about ten updates per minute (five updates/minute for both down and up events) from a single customer connection. Not only does the amount of up/down announcements increase during this period, but the refresh announcements are elevated too. As we will show later, this is due to the level of aggregation changing, resulting in more announced routes. Not only is the instability producing more load on the network from down/up events, it also introduces more announced routes, further aggravating the problem.
While these graphs give a good understanding of the characteristics of the updates over time, we need more detail to better understand the traffic breakdown. In particular, we want to look at some of the numbers that are significant but don't show up on the graphs. 16 ,000 of the modified events are due to the route tag changing and about 4,000 are due to changes in the metric type bit. The route tag is a 32-bit field used to pass meta-data through the OSPF cloud. For example, a router connected to a customer network using BGP might use this field to record the originating AS number. This would allow another properly configured router to decide whether or not to inject the OSPF advertisement back into BGP. We know that this field is used on MichNet to classify specific prefixes, however the large number of changes is surprising. We discuss in more detail in [16] . The metric type bit is used to distinguish between external metrics that are comparable to OSPF metrics and external metrics that are considered much larger than OSPF metrics. However, since most of these external routes have only one connection to the backbone, this bit is used for administrative purposes rather than for routing.
Sources of instability
The previous section has identified some major instability in the network. This next section attempts to characterize these periods of instability both by their symptoms and by possible causes.
Breakdown by router
One possible source of undesirable behavior is a software or hardware problem in a single router flooding the network 1  3  5  7  9  11  13  15  17  19  21  23  25  27  29  31  33  35  37  39  41  43  45  47  49  51  53 1  3  5  7  9  11  13  15  17  19  21  23  25  27  29  31  33  35  37  39  41  43  45  47  49  51  53  55 Router ID with LSA updates. To examine this, we've split updates by router. Figure 4 shows the average number (by day) of type 1 (router) links and type 5 (external) prefixes by advertising router. For simplicity, the routers are ordered by total number of links, and given a unique id. As the graph shows, the distribution of routes is concentrated in a small subset of the routers.
In comparison, figure 5 shows the percentage of updates by type produced by each router, using the same ordering as in figure 4 . These numbers only include down, up, new, and modified events, excluding the more benign refresh and timeout events. Also, the results are normalized by type to prevent the type 5 updates from overwhelming the graph. As with the link density, the updates are dominated by a small subset of routers. This skewed distribution is more prominent with the type 5 (external) LSAs than with the type 1 (router) LSAs. For the type 5 LSAs, this skew is somewhat correlated with the number of underlying links. Other than router 28, the top seven routers produce most of the type 5 updates. The type 1 updates are much less correlated with the number of underlying links.
The main causes of instability from the top eight routers can be traced to failures in external routing protocols and from router misconfiguration. For example, router number 54 produces the largest level of updates mainly due to the large period of instability in the later part of May. As we mentioned before, this is caused by a single customer connection. The instability, caused by the BGP connection to the customer, was injected without filtering directly into OSPF. Router number 52, on the other hand, announces the largest single source of instability. An error in the router configuration caused the router to announce a prefix assigned to France Telecom. Without any real underlying connection, this route flapped unhindered for the period of a week. The explanations for the other routers are similar, and can be found in [16] . These results show that several routers contribute disproportionately to the instability in the network. This is due to individual links on the router and does not represent a problem systemic to the router in question.
Length of instability
We now know that the instability we see on the network is usually due to a single source. The next issue we want to address is the timing of these periods of instability. First we examine how long a particular link stays down or up; then we investigate how long the periods of instability themselves last.
To understand how long links spent in the down and up states, we measured the amount of time each link spent in each state. We then plotted the cumulative distribution function by number of periods over the length of these periods. Figure 6 shows the graph for the type 5 LSAs. The type 1 link announcements are similar, with a higher percentage of short periods. On an ideal network, we would hope that the links would stay down for relatively short periods of time, and up for significantly longer. This data shows that there are many periods when the prefix or link was only up or down for a very short period of time: 53% of the type 5 periods lasted less than five minutes, while 75% of the type 1 link periods lasted less than 2.5 minutes. While the low periods for the down events might suggest stability, this concentration of very short periods for both down and up events indicates the links are flapping, or oscillating quickly between the down and up states. This behavior is definitely undesirable. On the other hand, the distribution is heavy tailed. About 1%, or 3790, of the type 5 up periods and 2%, or 1098, of the type 1 up periods lasted longer than thirty days. On the other hand, about 3020 or 0.8% of the type five down periods and 211 or 0.5% of the type 1 down periods lasted longer than 30 days. One important consideration is that we are looking at the distribution by period count, not by length. In other words, a three month period is counted the same as a five minute period. So, while this data shows significant amounts of traffic in the network, individual links are predominantly stable. Looking at the amount of time each link stayed up or down gives us an idea of how much flapping is seen on the network. We also want to understand how long these periods of instability last. The next graph shows the length of these periods of instability. We first collect all periods less than a given threshold. We then string adjacent periods together to determine how long the instability lasted. Figure 7 shows the cumulative distribution of the periods of instability for different thresholds. We strung together sequences of up/down events that were 30 seconds, 1, 2, and 5 minutes apart. The result is that most of the periods of instability are relatively short; 80% of the five minute sequences last for less than two minutes. More significant are the top few that last up to 5.5 days. The most prominent of these is the France Telecom link we discussed earlier which continuously changes state at least once every five minutes for 5.5 days. In fact, this is the largest single source of instability on the network. This is indicative of a larger problem caused by mistyped prefixes causing single routers to inject random prefixes into OSPF for short periods of time. The second longest period of instability is a collection of routes that flap every five minutes for 2.5 days. Unlike the previous period, this one appears to be composed of about ten legitimate customer prefixes. They do however, exhibit the behavior we discussed before of a change in aggregation level. the same address ranges than we see during stable periods, most likely due to errors in BGP.
Routing Topology
While previous sections have tried to characterize the type and distribution of the LSA updates, this section attempts to characterize the impact these periods of instability have on the network. The most obvious impact on the network is changes in the topology of the network. This can cause packets to be lost or delivered out of order. Also, changes in the routing topology correspond to each router running the shortest path algorithm. This is a relatively expensive operation, producing extra load on the router and causing a delay in the convergence of the network. In addition to collecting the raw OSPF data, we also simulated the shortest path calculation performed by each router. This analysis uncovered two important results. First, the routing topology was constantly changing over time, with specific configurations lasting shorter than 28 days. Additionally, the changes in the topology were incremental, only requiring slight changes in the shortest path tree.
We first studied how the routing topology changes over time. To do this, we assigned an identifier to each unique shortest path tree that we saw. The results for one router are shown in figure 8 . The graphs for other routers were very similar. For each shortest path calculation, we plotted the unique id at the corresponding time. So, for example, if a single link is flapping, we would expect to see the points on the graph oscillate between two different values over the period of instability. Because the shortest path trees are labeled increasingly over time, the y-axis also serves as a rough time measurement. Shortest path trees with lower valued ids were first seen earlier.
Looking at this data we see some surprising results. First, the overall trend is constantly increasing. In other words, the topology of the network is always changing and doesn't appear to focus close to a single configuration for long periods of time. We expect the network to constantly evolve as customers are added and links are upgraded. However, this is a surprising amount of change in the network topology, especially considering that we only looked at links between the core OSPF routers. This excludes any changes due to links to customer networks. We saw 1,852 unique shortest path trees from the perspective of a single router over the course of a year. This is an average of about five unique configurations per day. Close examination of the graph shows that there are periods when the topology oscillates between two different configurations. This reflects the instability produced by a single link flapping. However, the topology continues to change over time, with the longest duration of a single configuration lasting just 27.25 days.
With a better understanding of the changes in the topology over time, we wanted to investigate the incremental changes in topology. Figure 9 shows a graph of the difference between two adjacent shortest path trees for router 45. The metric used to calculate this difference is a simple count of the number of changed links. This was done by subtracting the adjacency matrices and taking the sum of the resulting values in the matrix. This should accurately reflect small changes in the network that cause a subset of the shortest path tree to shift. The most significant observation from this graph is that the overwhelming majority of the changes to the tree are very small. In fact, 65% of the shortest path calculations produce the same tree as the previous calculation. Note, in order to highlight this, the zero line has been shifted above the baseline. This is a strong argument for the use of an incremental shortest path first algorithm [2; 1].
These results highlight our observations from examining the LSA data. For the most part the instability in the network is confined to a small number of links. These links produce a large number of updates, but cause few actual changes in the topology of the network. In addition, the network exhibits a steady change over time due to physical changes in the topology. 
Detailed analysis
The previous sections explored the aggregate, coarse view of the network over the period of a year. From this perspective, we can see that there are periods of increased instability, but we have little understanding of the specifics of these anomalies. In addition, the aggregate view can completely miss significant anomalies that play an important role in the day to day performance of the network. This section focuses on two such anomalies. The first highlights a significant period of flapping caused by a single physical link. The second anomaly involves a single router sporadically injecting random routes into OSPF. These specific incidents highlight the general lack of comprehensive network monitoring tools available to network operators as well as the amount of instability external routes can introduce into OSPF.
Periodic Instability
The most noticeable period of instability can be seen in figure 2 during the end of May and beginning of June. Looking closer at the instability we can see that there are significantly more updates during this period than normal. In addition, the updates appear to be periodic. As you can see in figure 10 , this instability corresponds with the normal human waking cycles for the local time zone. While this kind of instability has been seen in BGP behavior before [9] , this is the only instance we've found in the OSPF data. Talking to the network operations staff, the source of this failure was indeed BGP. During this time period, the particular customer was upgrading their physical connection to MichNet. The prefixes for this customer are maintained using a BGP connection and are then injected into OSPF. However, there are no filters placed on this BGP data, so when BGP failed, all of the instability was directly injected into OSPF.
Despite the fact that this data appears to be caused by a single link, we see a large number of prefixes related to this instability, all allocated to the same customer. Surprisingly the number of prefixes announced for this customer triples during this period of instability. It appears that these extra prefixes are due to a change in the level of aggregation. Rather than aggregating several prefixes into one shorter prefix before injecting them into OSPF, the router was announcing the longer prefixes directly into OSPF. This has serious implications about the stability of the network. Not only can the number of updates increase during periods of instability, but the number of LSAs can increase due to aggregation failure. As with the periodicity, this instability is most likely caused by BGP failures being directly injected into OSPF without any filtering.
Aggregation Breakdown
The previous anomaly leads to another interesting observation. Router 53 from figure 4 shows even more variability as seen in figure 11 . Unlike the previous case, the increased number of routes for this router never persists for longer than three days. In addition, the increased levels are not localized to a single period. Looking at the trouble ticket system for MichNet, these increased routes correspond to recorded problems with this router. In addition, rather than adding subsets of existing routes, this router announces additional prefixes from different parts of the network. For example, announcing prefixes assigned to a customer from the western side of the state when the router is on the eastern side. In addition, as is the case with the France Telecom route, some of these routes appear to be completely unrelated to MichNet. Talking to the operations staff, it appears that all of these additional prefixes are caused by configuration errors. The routes from across the state are topologically neighbors to the announcing routers due to ATM links that span the state. In addition, the France Telecom link has a prefix very similar to ones assigned to MichNet. It appears that a simple typing mistake caused this prefix to be injected into OSPF without any real connection to an external protocol. While it is entirely possible that these extra routes would cause some of the problems seen in the trouble tickets, we're not able to definitively determine if the extra routes are the root cause or merely indicators of general configuration errors. It is clear however, that monitoring the routing protocols produces much faster detection of these types of configuration errors.
Conclusion
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of an operational OSPF network over the period of a year. We looked at the overall traffic levels, characterized the instability in the network, and analyzed the changes in routing topology over time. In addition we provided detailed analysis of the largest periods of instability we saw on the network. We found that routes injected from external routing protocols were the predominant source of instability within OSPF. In addition we found that these periods of instability often went undiagnosed due to the lack of routing protocol information available to network operators. Finally, we showed that the routing topology is constantly changing over time. However, the individual changes are localized, necessitating only minor changes in the shortest path tree at each router.
We plan to do further research into the interaction between OSPF and other routing protocols. These routing protocols often have undesirable characteristics that can negatively impact the performance of OSPF. Limiting their impact would decrease the load on the network, providing better performance for the network as a whole. Unfortunately, the links to customer networks are one of the largest sources of administrative headaches. Using dynamic routing protocols greatly simplifies the configuration of both the ISP and customer routers. While it might be possible to minimize the impact of these injected routes, administrative issues make current solutions undesirable.
We are also interested in exploring the impact that OSPF has on BGP announcements made to the rest of the Internet. While most of the information injected into BGP from OSPF is aggregated into shorter prefixes, preliminary analysis has shown that instability in OSPF can transition into BGP. This has significant implications as BGP routing updates have a broad impact on the global Internet.
